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I. INTRODUCTION 
Substantial Japanese direct foreign investment did not begin until 
about ten years after the commencement of the postwar period of rapid 
growth. The first postwar case of foreign investment was approved by 
the government in 1951, but the annual flow of such investment did not 
exceed $500 million until the late 1960 1 s. During the period 1970-72 
the Japanese government liberalized the rules for such foreign 
investment, the flow of which increased rapidly to average $2 billion a 
year during 1970-75. By the second half of the 1970 1 s direct foreign 
investment was around the level of $5 billion per year. 
In the 1960 1 s there were relatively few studies of Japanese overseas 
-investment, undoubtably due to the small amounts taking place in 
comparison with the overall size of the economy. In the last decade 
however there have been many studies, analyzing Japanese direct foreign 
investment from a variety of viewpoints. These have included the 
inducements to such investment, the relationship between investment and 
structural changes in the Japanese economy, analyses of investment by 
industrial sector, and the impact of investment on the host country's 
economy. Indeed, very comprehensive studies of Japanese direct foreign 
investment exist in English; most of these however have made no 
reference to the discussions by economists in Japan of such investment. 
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The main objectives of this short survey are therefore the following: 
1. To do a general survey and analysis of the studies of Japanese 
direct foreign investment; 
2. To summarize the main points of the Japanese-language studies 
which have received the most critical attention in Japan; and 
3. To give some thoughts on what course Japanese direct foreign 
investment may take in the near future. 
In section II the general features of Japanese foreign investment in the 
postwar era will be examined, especially as they relate to the growth of 
the domestic economy. Section III will extend this by looking at 
investment in manufacturing in more detail. Part IV will provide a 
summary, and a look towards the future. 
As much as possible the following pages will be confined to the 
economic aspects of direct foreign investment. Recently foreign 
investment has become a topic in international political discussions, 
typically looking at the interests of the investing country or investor 
in contrast to those of the host country; the Japanese case is no 
exception. There have also been studies of other non-economic aspects, 
such as business management problems and cultural problems. Studies of 
such investment from the standpoints of political science and business 
management will be ignored herein. 
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II. POSTWAR JAPANESE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The general features of postwar Japanese direct foreign investment 
are closely related to aspects of the domestic economy. During the past 
30 years the economy grew tremendously, and as a result the structure of 
the economy -- the sectoral distribution of industrial production, 
sectoral employment patterns, the balance of payments structure, etc. 
also changed greatly. It is natural to ask what impact such changes may 
have had on Japanese foreign investment, especially as its composition 
has also changed markedly over time. One can in fact trace ·certain 
aspects of foreign investment which change in line with the domestic 
economy, and hence look at such investment within the same framework as 
domestic investment. The growth of direct foreign investment thus is 
seen as a natural consequence of the overall growth of the economy, as 
will be outlined below. 
1. Postwar Economic Growth 
Among the many features of Japan's postwar growth, four of them seem 
to be important in explaining Japanese direct foreign investment. The 
first is the sheer expansion in size of the economy, with the real GNP 
(1970 prices) 4.3 times larger in 1970 than in 1955. 1 Second, the 
industrial structure has been transformed from a labor intensive to a 
capital and high-technology intensive type. Related to this is a third 
factor, the change of the economy from one with a relative scarcity of 
capital and surplus of labor in the 1950's to one with labor scarcity 
and capital surplus by the end of the 1960's. Thus, although business 
1 Data source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook, 1981. 
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cycles have had a large short-run impact, there has been a long-run 
trend with labor and land costs rising relative to that of capital (that 
is, the real interest rate). Finally there has been a shift in the 
structure of the balance of payments. Raw materials such as crude oil, 
iron ore and coal now account for more than 60% of imports, while 
exports have shifted from labor intensive to capital intensive goods. 
' 
In addition, under the fixed exchanged rate system, this led to a steady 
growth of exports of manufactured goods and hence to "structural" 
balance of payments surpluses from the late 1960 1 s through 1973. 
2. Changes in Direct Foreign Investment 
The traditional classification of industry into a primary sector of 
agriculture and fishing, a secondary sector of manufacturing and a 
tertiary sector of service industries is a useful starting point for 
analyzing.Japan's foreign investment. Table I gives such a breakdown of 
.total Japanese foreign investment, based on the approved accumulated 
amount for such investment. At the end of FY1979, 2 it came to some 
US$31.8 billion. The total growth of such investment, detailed in Table 
II, was also quite high, coming to about 29% pa in the 1960's and 27.5% 
pa in the 1970's. Investment remained high in the late 1970's, in spite 
of the slow growth of the domestic economy, and all indications are that 
it will continue to increase during the next five years from the curr~nt 
level of $6 billion per year. Even after discounting for inflation, 
this is a rapid growth, compared to the Japanese domestic economic 
growth rate. 
2 The Japanese fiscal year ends March 31, e.g. FY79 ended March 31, 
1980. 
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Returning to the industrial breakdown of foreign investment, at the 
end of FY1979 about 34% was in the manufacturing sector, 23% in the 
resources-related primary sector and 47% in the tertiary sector. While 
these percentages are quite sensitive to the sectoral classification in 
which certain key industries are included, 3 it is still quite useful to 
examine them. First, one should note the changes in sectoral 
distribution of outstanding investment over time. As of FY1960, 
investment in manufacturing constituted the largest share, with tertiary 
the smallest; by FY1979 tertiary had come to be the largest. Looking at 
the data in more detail, early direct foreign investment was 
concentrated in the manufacturing and resource related sectors. In the 
domestic economy this time period saw the transition from a 
labor-intensive industrial structure to a capital and technology 
intensive one. In addition, the emphasis in the developing countries of 
Latin America and Asia on industrialization by primary import 
subs'titution had an important impact on Japanese. overseas manufacturing 
investment. In contrast, tertiary sector investment was very high in 
the 1970 1 s. 
From this one can begin to view the early growth of foreign 
investment as dominated by the import substitution strategies of the 
developing countries, and by the need for natural resources of the 
rapidly growing domestic economy. During this early period, the 
weremarketing of output and service needs of Japanese firms overseas 
3 Lumber and pulp, for example, are included in the secondary sector, as 
are chemical and iron- & metal-related industries. One could reasonably 
argue that many of these belong more properly in the primary sector, 
especially as foreign investment in these industries in the 1970's was 
often motivated by natural resource considerations. 
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handled by local institutions or by banks and insurance companies which 
had been established through American and European tertiary direct 
foreign investment. From the second half of the 1960 1 s, however, 
Japanese tertiary investment began to increase, with Japanese firms 
abroad coming to depend more and more on Japanese rather than local or 
other-country multinational firms for their service needs. Thus under 
this hypothesis Japanese tertiary investment depended on the prior 
existence of manufacturing investment. In fact two patterns of tertiary 
investment can be distinguished, with the above one applying to 
developing countries. In developed countries, on the other hand, from 
the early stages on investment was concentrated in the tertiary sector. 
The examination of the regional distribution of investment, detailed in 
Tables IV-a and IV-b, back up this approach. Many studies have 
discussed this, such as Sekiguchi (1978), Kojima (1977), Yoshino (1976) 
and Ozawa (1979). The main points which ·they noted were that (1) the 
investment in developed countries was concentrated in the tertiary 
sector and (2) in developing countries was largely in the primary and 
secondary sectors. 
Looking at the distribution in greater detail, one can group the 
developing countries into three regions, Asia, Latin America and the 
Middle East. Not surprisingly in the Middle East almost all investment 
was directed to natural resources. In Asia, where the largest amount of 
Japanese investment took place, almost all was directed to manufacturing 
until the early 1970 1 s; since then there has been a relative increase in 
the share of natural resources related investment. In Latin America 
investment has been even more concentrated in the manufacturing sector 
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l 
than in Asia. The scale of an individual investment also varies from 
region to region, being relatively small in Asia and relatively large in 
Latin America, as discussed by Sekiguchi (1978) and Ozawa (1979). A 
different pattern is apparent for the developed countries. In regions 
such as the U.S. and Western Europe, investment was concentrated in the 
tertiary sector. 4 Two studies, those of Sekiguchi (1978) and the
• 
Economic Planning Agency (1980), have discussed the relationship of this 
to the "trade friction" which is currently a topic between these 
advanced countries and Japan, with a change being seen from the previous 
pattern of tertiary investment in sales and marketing related areas to 
one of investment in manufacturing. It should also be noted that while 
countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand must be considered 
developed countries, they are relatively resource-rich, and it is this 
that has dominated Japanese investment. 
Compared with other areas of her economy, there have been relatively 
few econometric studies of Japanese direct foreign investment. One of 
the studies is Bank of Japan (1973); in it economists at the bank did a 
general analysis as well as econometric work. The study noted that, 
compared with the direct foreign investment of other developed 
countries, that of Japan was directed to services and natural resources 
from the mid-1950's to the early 1970's. Furthermore, the investment of 
the other developed countries was directed largely to other advanced 
nations, while a large share of Japan's was in developing countries. 
They also noted the tendency mentioned previously for the investment in 
developing countries to be in the resource and manufacturing sectors and 
4 Under the impetus of trade friction manufacturing investment in these 
areas (e.g. TV's) has recently increased. 
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for that in the developed countries to be more in services. In its 
econometric work, the bank tried two approaches, one looking at the 
overall behavior of Japanese firms and the other at sector-by-sector 
behavior. Table VI outlines their results. As can be seen in the 
regressions on overall behavior, foreign investment was strongly 
correlated with the wage gap between Japan and other countries, both 
developed (the U.S.} and developing (Korea}. Second, interest rate 
differentials between Japan and the outside (the Eurodollar rate) also 
had a large impact. Finally, the foreign investment restrictions of the 
Japanese government were important. 
It should be noted here that until the early 1970's foreign exchange 
licenses were approved under a quota system, with the amount of dollars 
available for the purpose of direct foreign investment varying with the 
status of the balance of payments. The restrictions on approval of 
licenses for direct foreign investment purposes were gradually eased in 
the early 1970's, and have been granted automatic approval since that 
date. Licenses are still required, and are the source of the data 
discussed in this paper. During the 1950 1 s and 1960's demand for 
licenses exceeded the quota allotment. The greatest priority was given 
to natural resource investment, with tertiary investment (for trading 
offices, etc.) also having a high priority; manufacturing investment 
obtained the residual amounts, if any. Another government policy that 
affected direct foreign investment was the provision of loans through 
the Export Import Bank of Japan and other institutions. The amounts 
were relatively small, and the overall impact of such loans on foreign 
investment decisions was undoubtably negligible, except for 
resources-related projects. 
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In the sectoral regressions, the main determinants of 
resources-related investment were the dummy variables for policy 
changes. For manufacturing investment, the wage gap between Japan and 
developing countries, along with policy variables, were the main 
factors. It should be noted that for the time period which the 
regression covered, most manufacturing investment was indeed in 
developing countries. 
Recently though there has been an increase in investment in the 
developed countries, so that now a variable for the wage differential 
between Japan and other developed countries may be significant (although 
if trade friction is in fact the driving force in recent years this may 
not be the case). Another facet of the Bank of Japan study is that in 
all their regressions the dependent variables take the form of a stock 
ratio, that of Japanese direct foreign investment to Japanese domestic 
investment. The study is thus implicitly viewing foreign investment as 
a substitute for domestic investment. The study also uses Korean wages 
as a proxy for developing country wages. This choice appears to have 
been governed by data availability, as that available for most 
developing countries is very poor in quality. It is questionable though 
that Korean wages are representative of those in Southeast Asia or most 
other developing countries. 
Foreign exchange licenses are the source of the data used in almost 
all studies of Japanese foreign investment. Theoretically all 
transactions are covered by such licenses, with the dollar (not yen) 
value of the license at time of issue being the number that is compiled. 
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The information from these licenses is published in three forms. First, 
they are the source for the direct foreign investment item in the 
Japanese balance of payments data. This balance of payments figure is 
compiled and published on a quarterly basis, as a single number without 
any disaggregation as to industry or direction. The figure reflects the 
actual foreign exchange flow during the quarter being reported. The 
second and more widely used form is that published by the Bank of Japan 
on an annual basis, giving the volume of licenses issued broken down by 
country in which the inve,stment is to occur and the industry involved, 
and giving an industry-by-region decomposition. The third form in which 
the data are reported is as a breakdown by industry and country for each 
year, but generally this is available only with several years' delay. 
Unlike the balance of payments figure, the Bank of Japan compilation 
represents licenses issued and not the actual flow of foreign exchange, 
and is published only for yearly and not quarterly periods. There is 
thus some discrepancy between the B/P figure and the aggregate BOJ 
figure, both because of delays between the issuing of licenses and the 
actual flow of funds, and because the full amount allowed for in the 
license may not ultimately be invested. A second source of difficulties 
is that in fact not all foreign exchange transactions are covered by 
licenses. One field study in the Philippines (Tsuda [1977], (1978]) 
showed there to be a large number of cash investments made through the 
black market by small firms. The total amount of such illegal or 
unreported investments was however relatively small, and so it may be 
safe to assume that the flow value figures are reasonably accurate even 
if smaller transactions (and hence the total number of transactions) may 
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be significantly underestimated. A more fundamental problem is that the 
data are for the flow and not stock of investment, while it is the stock 
of investment that is a crucial variable for estimating the impact of 
direct investment on the host economy and other purposes. Thus, while a 
11 stock11 figure may be reported (see Table I), it is merely a summation 
of the annual flow data and does not take into account increases in 
' 
value due to retained earnings, decreases in value due to repatriation 
or bankruptcy, or changes in value arising from foreign exchange rate 
fluctuations. The data also make no distinction between investment 
representing a minority holding or a controlling share in the local 
firm, and more importantly, they do not distinguish between share 
capital and loah equity. The latter is a significant issue as loans can 
be used to facilitate profit repatriation (through principal and 
interest repayments) in the face of controls on the level of dividends 
that may be paid. While potentially some loans are converted to share 
equity if a venture proves successful, in general loans will lead to an 
overstating of the 11 stock11 of direct foreign investment. In fact, loans 
have been particularly important in primary sector investment, where 
capital equity is a minor share (typically less than 5%). Manufacturing 
investment, on the other hand, has occurred principally in the form of 
share equity. Loan/capital proportions however vary widely from 
case-to-case and country-to-country. The Bank of Japan collects data on 
this breakdown on a confidential basis, and has published some summaries 
(see HOF [1977)). 
Another source of data of which little use has so far been made are 
the figures compiled by various industry associations. These are 
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potentially much more accurate, both in flow and especially stock terms, 
but at most a few have been published. They may not be available for a 
sufficient number of industries to be of much use for a comprehensive 
study, but they could be valuable for work on an industry or a small 
sample of industries. Finally, many developing countries also try to 
collect data on foreign investment, but the quality tends to be poor and 
I 
the level of disaggregation is low. The conclusions of studies based on 
such data are thus suspicious. 
A more recent study which is similar to Bank of Japan (1973) in many 
respects is that of the Economic Planning Agency (19~0). Unlike the BOJ 
study, that of the EPA did not do sectoral regressions, working only 
with aggregate data. A second difference is that the EPA study is based 
on flow rather than stock variables .. As explanatory variables, like the 
BOJ study, the interest rate differential, two wage gap variables 
(Japan-Korea and Japan-u.s.) were used. In addition the EPA study 
included an index of Japanese economic activity, a world commodity price 
index, and the ratio of OECD imports from Japan to total OECD imports 
were used. The results they obtained are quite interesting. First, 
like the BOJ study the EPA study found the wage gap variables as a whole 
not to be highly significant; and the lag structure for developing 
countries was longer than that for the developed countries. The study 
suggests that this might be due to "country risk" being greater in 
developing countries, so that a causal factor such as lower wages 
induces investment after a longer lag than it would in the developed 
world. Japanese economic activity exhibited a consistently positive 
relationship to direct foreign investment, but the t-statistics on the 
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whole were relatively small and there seems to be no compelling reason 
for a positive correlation. Tsuji (1976) had proposed that the Japanese 
business cycle, by affecting the availability of finance to 
corporations, would thus also affect foreign investment timing. The 
data on direct investment though has such a strong time trend that this 
would be very hard to test statistically. 
III. JAPANESE OVERSEAS INVESTMENT IN MANUFACTURING 
In Section II, two studies which looked at overall Japanese foreign 
investment were discussed; these studies tended to focus on domestic 
factors which affected such investment. Certainly those influences were 
very important, b~t in addition foreign investment is strongly affected 
by the host country's economic situation as well as its policy towards 
foreign capital and various non-economic factors such as political and 
social stability. In addition to these two general studies, there have 
been also many studies which looked at a particular country or 
industry. All of them note that Japanese direct foreign investment in 
manufacturing was labor intensive as opposed to capital intensive; 
concentrated in developing countries, especially in East and Southeast 
Asia, and relatively small in the scale of the individual investment. 
These specific studies then focused on the factors peculiar to a 
particular area, both at a point in time and with the changes that came 
with economic and political development. 
Three key theoretical studies are those of Uzawa and Hamada, 
published in Uzawa (1969); Hamada (1971) and Kojima (1972). The 
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Uzawa-Hamada study is not concerned with Japanese foreign investment, 
but rather with investment in Japan from abroad. From the end of the 
1960's into the early 1970's an important topic of economic debate were 
the affects of the liberalization of capital flows into and out of 
Japan. The Uzawa-Hamada papers were written as part of the discussion 
of problems relating to this among economists and the government 
' 
(primarily MITI). They tried to show theoretically that in the presence 
of import restrictions such as tariffs and quotas, capital 
liberalization could decrease the welfare of the domestic economy. 
Their result might equally well be applied to Japanese manufacturing 
investment abroad, which most often takes place in the face of just such 
trade restrictions. But in order to use their model one must make 
certain assumptions about the distribution of stockholders and 
regulations concerning profit remittances, so that for other countries 
the implications may be unclear. This is particularly true as many 
developing countries regulate the conditions under which foreign 
investment is permitted, typically limiting the maximum share that 
foreign concerns may hold in a firm, as well as setting a ceiling on the 
fraction of investment that may be remitted as profits in a given year. 
The Kojima study is much less theoretically "clean" than that of 
Uzawa-Hamada, but it is more interesting for the light it shines on 
Japanese foreign investment behavior. Kojima's main contribution is the 
classification of direct investment into two patterns, a Japanese and an 
American one. According to his typology, Japanese-type investment was 
engaged in by firms with a comparative disadvantage in international 
trade, that is, by firms in a poor position export; hence it served to 
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augment trade. American-type investment, on the other hand, tended to 
be made by firms which were strong exporters, and thus was a substitute 
for trade. It should be noted that for the purposes of his discussion 
Kojima defined comparative advantage in terms of the profit rate, rather 
than using the normal textbook framework of comparative costs. 
Kojima's analysis stimulated a flurry of papers, criticislng him from 
various standpoints. Watanabe (1974) felt that Kojima was inconsistent 
in showing how his definition of comparative advantage would lead to his 
investment typologies. Ikemoto (1975} pointed out that this approach 
did not take note of the specific factors which case studies pointed out 
as leading to foreign investment, while Watanabe (1974} looked at the 
implications of this approach for the analysis of national welfare. 
Kojima set forth a numerical example of his use of the comparative 
rate of profit. He posited two countries, A (the U.S.) and B (Japan); 
two industries, X and Y; and profit rates, foreign and domestic, for 
each countries industries: X0 and Y0 the U.S. domestic and X1 and Y1 the 
U.S. foreign profit rates, with x 0 , y 0 , and y1 the correspondingx 1 
Japanese firm profit rates. For his example he then set: 
"A" Investment Pattern Domestic Profit Rate Foreign Profit Rate 
X Industry = 5% = 13%X0 X1 
Y Industry = 10% = 33%Y0 Y 1 
11 J 11 Investment Pattern Domestic Profit Rate Foreign Profit Rate 
x Industry Xo = 10% = 13%x 1 
y Industry Yo= 10% = 5%Y1 
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Using these profit rates, he then calculates the comparative profit ratios: 
13/5 
= > 1 (1) 
Xo / Yo 10/10 
which is the profit ratio for Japanese industry, while 
13/33 
= < 1 (2) 
5/10 
for American industry. One source of confusion was tha~ Kojima in his 
original article miscalculated (2), obtaining a ratio greater than l; he 
corrected this error in Kojima (1977). He also chose numbers such that 
there was an absolute profit differential, so that his relative profit 
argument was superfluous. In general people have had difficulties with 
his theoretical framework in this ambitious attempt to explain Japanese 
overseas investment. Nevertheless his comparative profit approach is an 
interesting one. 
Along with such theoretical discussions, many empirical and case 
studies appeared in the 1970 1 s, of which the Bank of Japan and Economic 
Planning Agency studies cited earlier are examples. The most important 
of these other studies were case studies of a particular region or 
country, especially studies of East and Southeast Asia where Japanese 
direct foreign investment in manufacturing has a long history. 
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asRepresentative studies include Yoshihara (1978) of Southeast Asia a 
whole, Hirata (1973) of Taiwan, Tanaka (1971) of Southeast Asia, 
Takahashi (1973) of Southeast Asia, Inamura (1977) of the Philippines, 
and Sakurai (1975) of Thailand. The main focus of these studies was the 
analysis of the factors which affected the decision to invest, and the 
impact of direct investment on the host country's economy. There are 
t 
also a few studies which focus primarily on the impact on the host 
country of Japanese direct investment, notably Sekiguchi (1978) which 
looks at investment in Thailand, Somsak (1978) which examines the impact 
of direct investment on Thailand, and Thee Kian-Wie (1978) which focuses 
on Indonesia. 
The factors which these case studies highlight as being important in 
affecting Japanese direct investment decisions are somewhat at variance 
with those discussed in Tanaka (1971) and the Bank of Japan and Economic 
Planning Agency studies previously cited. In Southeast Asia (excluding 
Singapore) the main determinants of investment from the early 1960 1 s 
through the early 1970 1 s were import restrictions, such as tariffs and 
quotas. During this period the countries of the region were following 
an import substitution development strategy for which the increase of 
tariffs and other import barriers were primary policy tools. As a 
result the structure of their imports also shifted, with a reduction in 
imports of final consumer goods and an increase in the imports of raw 
materials which served as inputs for the production of consumer goods. 
In turn producer goods imports climbed sharply. As a result of this 
development policy, Japanese firms were unable to export final consumer 
goods to the region, which had been their principal exports to the 
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region up until then. At the same time, Southeast Asian countries 
provided insufficient domestic savings to finance their 
industrialization efforts, and thus undertook various policies to 
encourage foreign capital inflows. Potential manufacturing investors 
thus faced a protected market for their product alongside with other 
incentives, such as tax holidays. But with a very limited market, the 
' 
long-term growth of such direct investment has been inhibited, although 
there initially were a relatively large number of investments. This 
author for example calculated import and Japanese direct investment 
functions for Thailand (Sakurai (1975]). Import tariffs were found to 
be a significant factor in both cases. The wage gap between Japan and 
Thailand was not significant; this could however be due to the poor data 
on wages in Thailand (see Table VIII). 
In the E?-.st Asian "Newly Industrializing Countries" (defined to 
include Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan), Yoshihara (1976) found 
the wage gap together with foreign investment promotion policy to be the 
main explanatory factors for Japanese direct foreign investment. 
Certainly there is a large difference in the absolute wage levels of 
Japan and Southeast Asia, and a smaller but still sizable one between 
Japan and East Asia. But when viewed from the perspective of the 
marginal productivity of labor, the wage level of Southeast Asian 
workers was not necessarily low, while that of East Asia was relatively 
less high. In the East Asian countries one can of course find a period 
in which an import substitution strategy was followed in the 1950 1 s and 
early 1960 1 s, but during this period Japanese direct foreign investment 
was for other reasons negligible. During later periods a more export 
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oriented strategy was pursued, and active foreign investment promotion 
policies were followed. Examples of such policies would include the 
Kaohsiung export processing zone in Taiwan, the Masung export processing 
zone in Korea, and the nearly perfect liberalization of foreign capital 
in Hong Kong and Singapore. This constrast between Southeast and East 
Asia is thus also related to the regional distribution of sales by firms 
' 
established through Japanese direct investment. The sales of firms in 
Southeast Asia, as the discussion of import substitution would imply, 
were largely in the host country. In the NIC 1 s however the majority of 
sales were exports to Japan and third countries. This is detailed in 
Table V, which gives the results of a survey carried out by MITI in 1973 
(see MITI [1973]), in which it is seen that even at that comparatively 
early date the sales of the Japanese enterprises in the NIC 1 s were 
largely exports, while the sales of those in Southeast Asia were 85% 
domestic. Country by country data is not at present published, but the 
MITI survey noted that for Asia as a whole, 67% of the sales of firms 
with Japanese direct investment were in their home market, 10% in Japan, 
and 23% in other countries (see MITI [1978]). 
As mentioned above, there are two studies of the impact of Japanese 
investment on the host country; these consider overall investment and 
not just direct investment in manufacturing. They undertake both 
theoretical and empirical study of this question. Here the practical 
problems and theoretical approach taken in studying this issue will be 
commented upon briefly. As outlined above, a major determinant of 
Japanese direct foreign investment in Southeast Asia and Latin America 
has been the various import restrictions that have accompanied import 
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substitution industrialization. 5 It thus becomes possible to attempt to 
apply the Uzawa-Hamada model. With the poor statistical data available 
on the residence of stockholders in firms in which there is Japanese 
direct investment, and on employment, income distribution, resource 
allocation and technology transfer aspects, it is of course not possible 
to give a clear answer. In addition data on transfer pricing would need 
to be collected (Sekiguchi [1978]). The two principle studies to date, 
mentioned above, found Japanese direct foreign investment on the whole 
to have had very little impact. In Thailand for example the 1975 ratio 
of value added in all such enterprises to total GDP was only 0.97%, 
while employment in such firms accounted for only 0.06% of total 
employment (Somsack [1978]). These figures depend on the response to a 
questionnaire, and so are best viewed as rough estimates, and do not 
take into account any indirect effects. Somsack did mention the 
possibility that Japanese enterprises tended to crowd out local firms 
from capital markets, as such enterprises depended on the local 
financial market to meet their working capital needs. He concluded that 
in this aspect too the share was relatively minor, but that in spite of 
their overall small share, U.S. and Japanese firms had an impact through 
their transmission of business management pratices, marketing methods, 
technology, and aggressiveness that was quite beneficial. The author of 
the study on Indonesia in contrast actually found an overall negative 
impact. Due to the sketchy data available, it is hard to place any 
weight on this conclusion. These studies represent a first step, but to 
make a careful evaluation much more data will need to be collected, as 
5 U.S. manufacturing investment in Latin America showed a similar 
pattern to this in its initial period. 
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mentioned above. 
Two final questions will be examined, direct foreign investment by 
Japanese small businesses, and the so-called boomerang effect 6 of 
Japanese manufacturing investment abroad. One very interesting feature 
of Japanese overseas investment is the very high share engaged in by 
small businesses, in comparison to other advanced countries. Such 
investment from Japan has been concentrated in labor intensive 
industries, and have for the most part been in Southeast and East Asia. 
The recent economic development of these countries is also having 
important implications for the firms engaged in such investment. It 
will become much more important for such firms to strengthen their 
managerial resources in this area, and to promote product 
differentiation and the modernization of their sales and distribution 
systems, if they are to be able to meet the growing competitior. from 
local and other foreign firms (Sakurai [1979]). Although there have 
been only a few studies so far which have tried to evaluate it, the 
11 boomerang11 effect may be an important problem in certain industries, 
and could become a political problem when the affected industries are 
concentrated regionally, especially in light of the possibility that the 
future industrial structure will be much more strongly influenced by 
international comparative advantage and specialization considerations 
(Kitamura [1979]). At present the effect is difficult to measure 
statistically, primarily because it is hard to distinguish between 
11 normal 11 and 11 boomerang11 imports. 
6 The 11 boomerang11 effect is a term used in Japan to describe the 
negative impact on the Japanese economy when manufacturing direct 
foreign investment leads to a increase in imports of goods which had 
previously been manufactured domestically, or perhaps even exported. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Japanese direct foreign investment has many distinguishing features, 
such as the sectoral and regional pattern of investment; it is also 
closely linked to the post-WWII growth of the Japanese economy. There 
are also several factors in the host economies which affected Japanese 
direct investment. Not surprisingly, these differ among the developed 
and the developing economies. 
Starting from the points outlined in this survey, an attempt will 
now be made to indicate some future problems with and directions which 
such direct investment may take. The most important determinant of 
resources-related investment, as in the past, -is likely to be the growth 
(and thus the relative size to the rest of the world), of the Japanese 
economy. Nationalism and other trends in the resource-rich countries 
will of course also affect this. One possible direction would be for 
this to lead to resource-complementing manufacturing investment, which 
would permit indirect access to these resources by Japanese firms and 
would provide greater value-added to the host country. Tertiary 
investment, on the other hand, will be dependent on the growth of a 
Japanese manufacturing presence in the local (overseas) market. A 
recent trend though has been for Japanese "service" firms overseas to be 
more involved in the local market; this is likely to become more true in 
the future. It thus seems possible that the overall behavior of 
Japanese trading companies and banks abroad will change so as to be 
focused on the domestic markets of the developed countries, and thus 
become relatively independent of the rather limited market presented by 
-- page 22 
Japanese direct investment in resource or other sectors. Trading 
companies, for example, may take on more of an investment banker role, 
while financial firms will integrate themselves into the local markets, 
competing with host country firms for normal domestic or international 
business. Manufacturing investment presents a more complex picture. 
Until now such investment has been concentrated in developing countries, 
but with the wage gap between Japan and the developed countries having 
substantially narrowed, this bias will lessen; the continuation of trade 
friction with the developed countries will reinforce this change. As 
with earlier investment by manufacturers in the less developed world in 
the face of import substitution policies, Japanese direct investment in 
the developed world may also come to be a substitute for direct exports. 
Finally, we must note that compared with other statistics relating 
to the Japanese economy, those on overseas investment have been and 
continue to be very poor .. This complicates any attempt to evaluate what 
appears to be the growing importance of direct investment for the 
Japanese economy, as well as its impact on the host countries• 
economies. As concluded also by Sekiguchi (1979), with Japanese direct 
foreign investment likely to increase very substantially over the next 
several years, the failure to improve data collection will impose an 
increasingly wide gap between the knowledge and the actuality of such 
investment and its impact on Japan and the rest of the world. This may 
result in an important lacunae for policy makers in dealing with both 
domestic economic and foreign relations problems. 
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TABLE I 
JAPANESE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT -- TOTAL STOCK 
(accumulated approved investment from base year 1951,US$millions) 
FY1960 FY1970 FY1979 
Number !Amount Number Amount Number Amount 
Food 7 2.1 91 51 612 532 
(1.1) (0.7) (2.4) (1.4) (4.2) (1. 7) 
Textiles 14 27.1 243 189 838 1,546 
(2.1) (9.6) (6.5) (5.3) (3.9) (4.9) 
Lumber & Pulp 4 50.2 42 213 328 680 
(0.6) (17.7) (1.1) (6.0) (1.5) (2.1) 
Chemicals 15 10.8 165 48 716 2,312 
(2.3) (3.8) (4.4) (1.3) (3.3) (7.3) 
Iron & Metal 6 10.3 95 137 765 2,127 
(0.9) (3.7) (2.6) (3.8) (3.6) (6.7) 
Machinery 15 10.8 135 68 754 792 
(2.3} (3.8) (3.6) (1.9) (3.5) (2.5) 
Electronics 12 1.3 206 74 1,056 1,270 
(1.8) (0.5) (5.5) (2.1) (4.9) (4.0) 
Transport Machinery 5 15.2 40 86 217 803 
(0.8) (5.4) (1.1) (2.4) (1.0) (2.5) 
Other Manufacturing 26 9.4 277 60 1,208 805 
(3.9} (3.3) (7.4) (1. 7) (5.6) (2.5) 
Subtotal--Secondary 104 127.5 1,294 926 6,494 10,867 
(15.6) (45.0) (34.7) (25.9) (30.2) (34.2) 
Agriculture 8 2.9 84 54 618 570 · 
(1. 2) (1.0) (2.3) (1.5) (2.9) (1.8) 
Fisheries 22 4.0 86 26 384 267 
(3.3) (1.4) (2.3) (0.7) (1.8) (0.8) 
Mining 42 86.3 189 804 594 6,506 
(6.3) (30.5) (5.1) (22.5) (2.8) (20.5) 
Subtotal--Primary 72 93.2 359 I 884 1,598 7,344 
(10.8) (32.9} (9.6) (24.7) (7.4) (23.1) 
Construction 0 0 25 35 421 359 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.7) (1.0) (2.0) (1.1) 
Commerce 363 39.7 1,443 413 6,698 5,435 
(54.6) (14.0) (38.7) (11.5) (31.1) (17.1) 
Banking/Insurance 21 10.6 104 320 475 2,046 
(3.2) (3.7) (2.8) (8.9) (2.2) (6.4) 
Other 105 12.1 507 998 5,822 5,754 
(15.8) (4.3) (13.6) (27.9) (27.1) (18.1) 
Subtotal--Tertiary 489 62.4 2,079 1,766 13,416 13,594 
(73.5) (22.0) (55.7) (49.3) (62.4) (42.7) 
Total 665 283.0 3,732 3,579 21,508 31,804 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics, 
September, 1977 and Export Import Bank of Japan, Gyomu Binran, 1981. 
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TABLE II 
JAPANESE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT -- GROWTH RATE 
(average annual growth rate in per cent) 
Food 
Textiles 




























Iron & Metals 31.8 29.5 26.1 35.6 
Machinery 24.6 20.2 21.1 31.4 
Electrical 32.9 49.8 19.9 37- .1 -
Transport 23.1 18.9 20.7 28.2 
Other 26.7 20.4 17.8 33.4 
Subtotal I 28.7 21.9 19.6 31.5 
Agriculture 26.5 34.0 24.8 29.9 .· 
! 
Fisheries 14,6 20,6 18.1 29.5 
Mining 16.2 25.0 13.6 30.5 
Subtotal II 17 .4 25.2 18.0 
Construction 36.9 29.5 
Commerce 14,8 26.4 18.6 33.2 
Banking/Insurance 17.3 40.6 18.4 22.9 
Other 17.1 55.1 31.2 21.5 
Subtotal III 15,6 39.7 23.0 25.5 
Total 18.8 28.9 21.5 27.5 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Monthly Monetary and Financial 
Statistics, September, 1977 and Export Import Bank of 
Japan, Gyomu Binran, 1981. 
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TABLE III 
JAPANESE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT -- ANNUAL FLOW 
(average annual approved investment, US$ millions) 






















































































































































































Sources: Ministry of Finance, Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics, 
September, 1977 and Export Import Bank of Japan, Gyomu Binran, 
1981. 
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TABLE IV-A 
JAPANESE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY REGION & INDUSTRY 
(cumulative approved investments,FY1951 - FY1978, US$ millions} 
North America Latin America Asia Middle East 
I 
Number I Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount 
I 
Food 161 I 104 74 116 214 122 1 0 
I 
Textiles 80 I 145 119 324 496 836 3 4 
I 
Lumber & Pulp 31 263 36 170 198 123 
Chemicals 63 170 88 467 401 465 19 779 
Iron & Metals 37 227 69 417 347 689 9 43 
Machinery 126 137 91 221 365 178 5 6 
;,: 
Electrical 120 407 80 183 660 418 5 10 
Transport 19 44 30 280 124 203 5 4 
Other 134 87 84 66 766 376 . 16 39 
Subtotal 771 1,583 671 2,244 3,517 3,409 63 885 
Agriculture 87 118 106 118 252 190 3 2 
Fisheries 38 24 52 46 102 46 5 1 
Mining 125 455 101 639 147 2,670 9 39 
Construction 105 100 56 83 168 50 21 6 
Commerce 2,526 2,549 357 321 1,068 241 35 7 
Banking/Insurance 73 695 74 290 140 224 13 25 
Other 1,056 855 710 609 610 751 23 75 
Real Estate 1,501 327 84 16 114 21 2 370 
Business Offices 208 58 38 7 387 65 30 562 
Total I 6,490 I 6,765 2,249 4,373 6,559 7,668 204 1,971 
I I 
Source: Economic Planning Agency (1980}. 
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TABLE IV-B 
JAPANESE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY REGION & INDUSTRY 
(cumulative approved investments, FY1951 - FY1978, US$ millions) 
Europe 
Number Amount 
Food 22 38 
Textiles 38 110 
Lumber & Pulp 
Chemicals 46 81 
Iron & Metals 117 85 
Machinery 50 80 
Electrical 32 51 
Transport 8 11 
Other 60 66 
Subtotal 373 521 
Agriculture 2 0 
Fisheries 4 2 
Mining 9 859 
Construction 11 11 
Commerce 851 515 
Banking/Insurance 112 568 
Other 231 832 
Real Estate 131 26 
Business Offices 133 63 
























Number Amount Number Amount 
34 43 534 429 
6 4 786 1,457 
32 9.1 298 647 
17 98 639 2,074 
17 71 615 1,549 
12 11 649 632 
9 17 911 1,090 
9 112 196 653 
15 5 1,083 644 
151 452 5,711 9,174 
98 54 557 487 
74 37 332 195 
79 547 552 5,647 
9 6 377 274 
220 143 5,072 3,778 
24 44 446 1,848 
158 207 3,064 3,877 
44 4 1,891 766 
6 3 812 760 
863 1,496 118,814 126,809 
I I 
Source: Economic Planning Agency (1980). 
---
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TABLE V 
SALES BY MARKET, JAPANESE DIRECT FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN ASIA IN MANUFACTURING 
Host Markets of Not 
Country Japan Other Available 
Markets Countries 
45.2 42.7 .9.4 ,2. 7 
52.4 34.4 13.3 --
62.5 4.9 32.2 '/ 
96.0 3.9 0.1 
29.0 0.4 69.9 
93.9 0.6 5.5 I 
87.3 7.8 4.8 
69.1 3.8 22.5 4.6 
(1973). No country breakdowns on the direction of 
sales have been given since 1973, although MITI 
publishes yearly figures for "Total Asia". 
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TABLE Y..1. 
BANK OF JAPAN REGRESSION RESULTS 
Dependent variable: Kfdl/Kdom 
( 1 ) (2) ( 3) I (4) (5) I (6) (7) (8) (9) ( 10) I ( 11 ) 
I II 
Wj/Wdev 4.31 9.12 I 7.79 I 
-3._Jl* I { 21 I { !!-1 l**I {3.8)** I 
Wj/WI de 0.044 I 0.048 I I I 0.045 0.037 0.065 0.055 I 0.072 
1 J_ I** 1. 2 lll I I (1.7)** (1.4)* C2,2lll {2. 31**1 (4.0}(l 
Ij/ Ieuro -0.24 I -0.37 I -0.39 I -o. 16 I -0.04 
! 3, 2 lll 1{-!!,2l** C-2,ll** (-2,3)(l I {-2.2lll 
ljd/ Ieuro -0.16 I -0.30 I -o. 15 -0.25 -o. 14 -0.11 
c-2.61* I r-4.4l* I {-1.61** (-J,31**1 (-1,1)* (-2.0l** 
Mdev I -0.0025 -0.0017 I 
I {-3,3} {-2,3) I 
Mldc I -0.013 0.0046 II 
I (-0.2} (0.08) I I 
I IP I 1 .02 1.67 1. 90 I 1. 86 I 0.26 I 
{1. 8 l {2. 7) ! 3. 3 l I ( 3. 1 l I C3. 6 l II I 
23.9 23.0 22.4 I 0.01 IPol icy 24. 1 19.0 23.6 I 14.4 I 20.7 24.4 20.9 I 
{3.4) !3,2) {3.4) 14,4) ( 3. 6 l I (4.2) I.Ll.....2..1 (g_,_]_1 {3. 21 I {2.3l I {3.2} I 
Kfd i /Kdom 0.82 0.61 0.78 I 0.60 I 0.63 0.83 0.48 0.54 0.47 I 0.51 I 0.52 I 
1 gtr lag L1!L...!U LLfil (13.6) I {6.21 I {8.2) {2,8) {4.4) (4.2) (4,6) I {4. 7) I (2,2l I 
C 86.0 109.8 116.6 I 135. 3 I 108.7 81.1 88.5 103.8 111. 0 I 91.7 I 0.72 I 
_(_g_,_fil i.!L..Q.1 ( 3.4) I ! 4. 3 I I {3,8) {2. 1 l {3. 3 l (2.91 {3.7) I ! 3. 3 l I {4.6) I 
R' 0.9919 0--=--22..ll o.9921 I 0.993!!1 0,992Ql Q.991§ 0.9948 0.99JO 0,99421 0,99361 0.99231 
d L_.2_Q 2 .....Q2 1 .60 I 1. 64 I 1,84 I 1.22 1. 20 1.64 1. 76 I 1,60 I 1 . 82 I 
t-va ues in ( * lagged 2 quarters ** lagged 3 quarters # Iagged 4 qua rte rs 
Source: Bank of Japan (1974). The regression is from 1964/1 - 1973/1 I, using quarterly data. 
Notes: Kfdi = foreign direct investmentcapital stock (yen mil lion). 
Kdom = domestic capital stock (yen bi I I ion).
.\:LJ. = Japanese wage index, seasonally adjusted. 
Wdev = U.S. wage index, seasonally adjusted. 
Wide= Korean wage index, seasonally adjusted.
.Li = Japanese long-term interest rate, averag,ed over the quarter. 
leuro = Eurodol iar 3-month rate, averaged over the quarter . 
1 jd = lj less the 3-month yen-US$ forward margin (the swap differential}, averaged over the quarter. 
Mdev = Total OECD imports from Japan, lagged 1 quarter (US$ mi 11 ion) • 
Mldc = Total imports of Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and Brazil, weighted by the share therein 
of Japan's direct foreign investment stock, lagged 2 quarters (US$ million) . 
.!JE = Japanese Index of Industrial Produc•tion (1970 = 100), lagged 1 quarter. 
f>o_U!::_y = pol icy variable: 1964/1 - 1968/111 = O. 
1968/IV - 1970/1 I= 1 (Liberal lzation of investmentrules for trading companies). 
1970/1 I I - 1972/1 = 2 (Partial I iberal ization of I icenses by BOJ). 
1972/1 I - 1973/11 = 3 (Complete I iberal ization). 
fl.: is adjusted R2 • 
g Is Durbin-Watson statistic 
page 34 --
TABLE YJJ. 
Economic Planning Agency Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: DI 
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0.40 
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0.049 _,(o, 3 l 
-6.70 
,-, .2 l 
0.955 
d I 1.83 
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I 2.00 1.98 
I 
I 2.04 
Source: Economic Planning Agency (1980). t-values in ( ), -1 .•. -6 indicate quarters lagged.
The regressions are on quarterly data from 1967/1 - 1979/111. 
Notes: Jli = Foreign direct investment I icenses approved in the quarter.
Bondj = Japanese Corporate Bond Yield 
Bondus = U.S. Corporate Bond Yield (Moody A, Baa rated bonds).
Wage,j = Japanese Real Wage Rate Index (1975 = 100). · 
Wagek = Korean Real Wage Rate··...Jndex (1975 = 100).
Wageus = U.S. Real Wage Rate Index (1975 = 100).
ill = Japanese Index of Industrial Production (1975 = 100),
Reuters = Reuter Index of Yen/Doi lar Exchange Rate ( in US$).
lli = OECD imports from Japan.
Mqon,j = OECD imports from rest of world excluding Japan,
R2!L = Adjusted
Q = Durbin-Watson Statistic 
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Table VIII 
Sakurai Regression Results for Japanese 
Direct Foreign Investment in Thailand 
(1) log DI = -11.11 + 3.75 log (Tariff)~1 + 0.59 log DI_ 1
(-1.1) (1.2) (2.2) 
+ 0.19 log (Wj/Wthai)_ 1 + 1.14 log Ta:x:_ 1
(0.2) (0.5) 
R2 = 0.875 s = 0.309 d = 1.55 
(2) DI/GDP = -0.407 + 0.029 Tariff 0.0042 (Wj /Wthai )_ 1
(-2.3) {2.4) (-0.7) 
- 0.1576 (DI/GDP)_ 1
(-0. 5) 
R2 = 0. 728 s = 0.503 d = 2.92 
(3) DI/GDP = -0.3296 + 0.0304 Tariff 0.0044 (Wj/Wthai)_ 1 
(-1. 7) (2.5) (-0.8) 
- 0.0336 Tax_ 1
(-0.7) 
R2 = 0.744 s = 0.049 d = 2.82 
Source: Sakurai (1975). Regressions are for annual data for the period 
1961 - 1970. 
Notes:. DI = Japanese Direct Investment in Thailand (Bhat million). 
Wj = Japanese wage level (in Bhat). 
Wthai = Thai wage level (in Bhat). 
Tax Corporate taxes divided by manufacturing value added 
(Thai GNP statistics, Bhat million). 
GDP = Thai Gross Domestic Production (Bhat million). 
Tariff = Average tariff rate on manufactured imports, excluding 
machinery and chemicals. 
R2 = adjusted correlation coefficient. 
S = Standard error. d = Durbin-Watson statistic. 
